Consciousness and the Computational Mind
Ray Jackendoff, 1987

Introduction

Part I The Phenomenological Mind and the Computational Mind

Chapter 1. The Phenomenological Mind

1.1 Varieties of Experience

1.2 Positions on the Mind-Body Problem

1.3 Externalization, Form, Qualia, and the Unconscious

Chapter 2. The Computational Mind

2.1 The Computer Analogy

2.2 Attractions of the Computational Mind: Theory I

2.3 The Mind-Mind Problem

2.4 Positions on the Mind-Mind Problem: Theory II

2.5 Corollaries of Theory II

Chapter 3. Preliminaries to Descrption of the Computational Mind

3.1 Justification of the Computational Mind

3.2 Computational Theories and Computer Theories

Chapter 4. Forms of Information

4.1 Structure and Process

4.2 The Importance of Structure to Language and Memory

4.3 A Constraint on Syntactic Structure

4.4 Lashley's Observation: Theory III

4.5 Levels of Structure

4.6 The Disunity of Awareness: Theory IV

Part II The Language Faculty and What It Expresses

Chapter 5. Levels of Linguistic Structure

5.1 Phonological Structure

5.2 The Psychological Reality of Formalism

5.3 The Relation of Phonological Structure to Lower Levels

5.4 Syntactic Structure

5.5 Transformations and Processing

5.6 Phonological Segmentation: Intonation and Stress

5.7 Correspondence Rules and the Lexicon

5.8 Summary

5.9 Language Acquisition and Innateness

Chapter 6. Language Processing

6.1 The Logical Structure of Language Perception and Production

6.2 Holistic and Top-Down Influences in Language Understanding

6.3 Lexical Access During Speech Perception

6.4 The Time Course of Language Production

6.5 Bidirectionality in the Language Processor

6.6 Levels of Representation in Short-Term Linguistic Memory

6.7 The Function of Short-Term Linguistic Memory

6.8 The Selection Function of Short-Term Linguistic Memory

6.9 Summary: Theory V-A

Chapter 7. Boundary Conditions on Conceptual Structure

7.1 Meaning as a Component of the Computational Mind

7.2 Connections to Other Faculties

7.3 Approaches Ruled Out by the Mentalistic Postulate

7.4 Reference and Intentionality

7.5 Truth

Chapter 8. Some Elements of Conceptual Structure

8.1 Categorization

8.2 The Noncategorical Nature of Categorization

8.3 Preference Rule Systems

8.4 Ontological Claims: Some Major Categories of Concepts

8.5 Generalization of Spatial Concepts to Abstract Domains

8.6 Final Remarks

Part III Nonlinguistic Faculties

Chapter 9. Levels of Visual Structure

9.1 The Problem of Vision

9.2 The Form of Marr's Inquiry into Vision

9.3 The Primal Sketch and the 2 1/2 D Sketch

9.4 The 3D Model

9.5 Visual Imagery and the Imagery Debate

9.6 Remarks on Visual Processing

Chapter 10. The Connection between Language and Vision

10.1 Preliminary Correspondences

10.2 The 3D Model as a Central Representation

10.3 Visual Identification and Categorization

10.4 The Use of 3D Models in Word Meanings

10.5 Enriching the Conceptual-3D Connection

10.6 Summary

10.7 Special-Purpose Capacities that Draw on Vision

Chapter 11. Levels of Musical Structure

11.1 What Is Musical Cognition?

11.2 Tonal Systems

11.3 The Musical Surface

11.4 Grouping and Metrical Structure

11.5 Time-Span and Prolongational Reductions

11.6 Musical Understanding versus Linguistic and Visual Understanding

11.7 Musical Understanding and Musical Performance

11.8 Musical Affect: Toward a Level of Body Representation

11.9 Remarks on Musical Processing

Chapter 12. The Modularoty of the Computational Mind

12.1 Summary of the Levels

12.2 Hierachies and Headed Hierarchies

12.3 Fundamental Computational Principles

12.4 Larger-Scale Commonalities across Language and Music

12.5 What Part of Music is Specifically Musical?

12.6 General Characteristics of the Processors

12.7 Fodor's Modularity Thesis

12.8 A Finer-Grained View of Modularity

12.9 Central Processes

12.10 Acquisition of Modules: Innateness versus Learning

12.11 Summary

12.12 Perception and Cognition

Part IV The Phenomenological Mind and the Computational Mind, continued

Chapter 13. Processing Precursors to Consciousness

13.1 Reviews of Theories I - III

13.2 The Role of Modality-Specific Levels: Review of Theory IV

13.3 Short-Term Memory and the Selection Function: Theory V

13.4 The Role of Attention in Awareness: Theory VI

Chapter 14. The Intermediate-Level Theory of Consciousness

14.1 Some Theories of the Form of Awareness

14.2 The Form of Linguistic Awareness: Theory VII

14.3 The Form of Musical Awareness

14.4 The Form of Awareness in Visual Perception

14.5 The Form of Awareness in Visual Imagery: Theory VII Generalized

14.6 Remarks on "Sensation," Touch, Pain, Hunger, and the Self

14.7 The Unity of Entities in Awareness

Chapter 15. Amplifications of the Intermediate-Level Theory

15.1 The Affects: Theory VIII

15.2 How Is Introspection Possible?

Chapter 16. Closing Thoughts

16.1 Inexpressible Thoughts and Knowledge

16.2 How Does Language Aid Thought?

16.3 Last Overview

Appendix A: A Second Correspondence Rule between Intonation and Syntax

Appendix B: Possible Enrichment of the 2 1/2 D Sketch


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